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"God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": 
Freedom of Religion in the Post-modern Age 
Michael W. ~ c C o n n e l r  
In The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche, the fountainhead 
of post-modernism, tells of a madman who on a bright morning 
lights a lantern and runs to  the marketplace proclaiming "God 
is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! . . . There 
never was a greater event,-and on account of it, all who are 
born after us belong to a higher history than any history 
hitherto!"' The effect was powerful. For those capable of 
understanding, "some sun seem[ed] to have set, some old, 
profound confidence seem[ed] t o  have changed into doubt.'" In 
Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche's mythic hero carries the 
same message-"God is dead!"-throughout the earth, in a 
parody of the gospels: calling it his "gift" to mankindO4 But 
there is one exception. The book begins with an encounter 
between Zarathustra and a holy man living alone in the forest. 
Zarathustra asks the hermit what he does in the forest, and 
the hermit replies: "I make hymns and sing them; and in 
making hymns I laugh and weep and mumble: thus do I praise 
God. With singing, weeping, laughing, and mumbling do I 
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1. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, JOYFUL WISDOM 167-68 (Thomas Common trans., 
1960). The title is usually translated as The Gay Science. 
2. Id. at 275. 
3. Zarathustra, like Christ, leaves his home when he is thirty years old, goes 
into the mountains in solitude, and then begins to sojourn among the people 
preaching the truth about God. 
4. FRIEDRICH N I ~ S C H E ,  THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 5 (Thomas Common 
trans., Modern Library ed. 1970). 
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praise the God who is my God.775 The hermit then asks 
Zarathustra what he had brought as a "gift." Zarathustra, 
surprisingly, does not take up this invitation to tell the hermit 
the terrible truth of the death of God. Instead he says, 
evasively, 'What should I have to give thee! Let me rather 
hurry hence lest I take aught away from thee!" And 
Zarathustra leaves the old man to worship in peace. 
This is the story of religious freedom in the post-modern 
world. 
The first thing we notice about the story is the 
extraordinary gentleness with which Zarathustra treated the 
holy man. This is startlingly out of character for a philosopher 
who celebrates strength and derides mercy, who tells 
unflinchingly the hard truths and has no respect for those so 
weak that they must take refuge in comfortable lies and 
superstitions. Nowhere else in Zarathustra does the hero spare 
the sensibilities of his hearers. Nietzsche thus suggests that 
there is something different about the holy man. While for 
most men, word of the death of God is a "gift," for the saint it 
would "take away" something precious. And in like manner, the 
post-modern world is willing to leave the believer in peace. 
Religious belief, we realize, is precious to those who have it, 
and it would be pointless and mean to interfere with it. 
But what we notice next about the story is that the hermit 
was quaint and wrong. He was behind the times. He simply 
had not gotten the word. When Zarathustra was alone, 
Nietzsche tells us that he marvelled to himself, "Could it be 
possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it, 
that  God is dead!"' Zarathustra's forbearance was not based on 
any respect for the possible truth of the saint's beliefs. 
Zarathustra did not entertain that possibility. He could not. 
God is dead. You cannot argue with facts. His forbearance was 
an act of kindness, an  indulgence-not the product of a mind 
open to the possibility that the other possesses a truth. 
The third point we notice about the story is that i t  involves 
a hermit, living by himself in the forest. He did not preach or 
proclaim the word of God. He did not go into the village. He 
sang, laughed, wept, and-most revealingly-"mumbled," but 
these inarticulate sounds did not communicate. Zarathustra's 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7.  Id. at 6. 
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toleration was toward 'one who neither participated in public 
life nor entered public discourse. No such forbearance was 
shown to anyone in the village. If the hermit left the forest and 
attempted to enter into public discussion and debate, he would 
be given the news of God's death like everyone else. 
Can we recognize in Zarathustra the enlightened attitude 
toward religious faith in our age? Religious freedom is to be 
protected, strongly protected-so long as it is irrelevant to the 
life of the wider community. But allow religion to affect the law 
pertaining to, say, abortion; or allow religion to affect the way 
we educate our children in  our communities' schools; even 
allow religion to affect the way we celebrate holidays in public, 
and there is trouble. When these quaint and discredited beliefs 
spill over into the life of the community, we have crossed the 
line. Religion, the Supreme Court has told us on more than one 
occasion, is "a private matter for the individual, the family, and 
the institutions of private choice." Religion in public is at best 
a breach of etiquette, at worst a violation of the law. Religion is 
privatized and marginalized. It has nothing to offer to the 
public sphere. We will not interfere with solitary hermits in the 
forest, but they must stay out of the public square. 
Lest this characterization be viewed as a caricature, 
consider a brief recently filed by the respected Attorney 
General of the State of New York, Robert Abrams. The case 
involved the State's refusal to allow a religious group to use a 
public meeting room to show a religiously-oriented film about 
child rearing, even though these facilities were open by law to 
any "use[] pertaining to the welfare of the comm~nity."~ The 
group claimed this violated their freedom of speech, but the 
Attorney General defended the exclusion by arguing that 
[ulnlike the community purposes for which authority is 
designated in the statute, religion is an "individual 
experience," that is "inviolately private." Religion "must be a 
private matter for the individual." Religious advocacy, like 
petitioners' effort to persuade community residents to 
"instill[]" "Christian values" in their children ''from an early 
age," serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents 
and yields a benefit only to those who already believe.'' 
8. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
9. N.Y. EDUC. LAW 414(1Xc) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993). 
10. Brief for Respondent Attorney General at 24, Lamb's Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024) (citations 
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In other words, religion is "private" and religiously informed 
opinion of no public benefit. 
I t  is inconceivable that a public official would say that 
about any other worldview. If feminists, gay-rights activists, 
Afro-centrists, or even secular conservatives tried to 
communicate their ideas about child rearing to the public, 
Abrams would never say they should keep their ideas to 
themselves, o r  that their ideas "yield a benefit only to those 
who already believe." In an open society, we presume that the 
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"" exchange of viewpoints 
benefits us all. 
We do not yet live in the post-modern world; perhaps we 
never will. It  is heartening that Abrams's argument was 
rejected by a unanimous Supreme Court. Many millions of 
Americans find the meaning of life in their churches and 
synagogues, through their religious traditions, and in personal 
encounters with their God. Religion has not been confined to 
the purely private, but informs discussions of justice and 
provides a framework for community. Unsecular America has 
not lost its voice. But in most of academia, and in  many walks 
of life dominated by the secular elite, the news of the death of 
God has been taken to heart and the voice of religion is all but 
silenced. We live in an age when previously marginalized 
voices are welcomed to the public dialogue. But religion, 
somehow, is different. Religion must be kept under wraps. This 
essay is a diagnosis, and a warning-and perhaps also a plea 
for old-fashioned broadmindedness. 
11. EARLY LIBERALISM AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
To talk about post-modernism requires us first to talk 
about modernism. And to talk about modernism is to talk 
about 'liberalism," which is modernism's politics. Liberalism is 
the doctrine (or family of doctrines) that places individual 
freedom a t  the center of political aspiration. For the most part, 
the liberalism we see today is secular liberalism. We tend to 
forget that liberalism was born of concerns about religion. 
Virtually all the great political thinkers of the formative stage 
of liberalism-Hobbes, Bodin, Spinoza, Bacon, Hooker, Milton, 
omitted). After this article was prepared, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
the Attorney General's argument. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148-49. 
11. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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Sidney, Locke, Hume, Bayle, Voltaire, Montesquieu, 
Montaigne, Smith, Burke, and Rousseau, not to mention more 
obviously "religious" figures like Calvin, Luther, More, and 
Erasmus-grappled with the issues of religion and government. 
Liberalism came about when and where it did because the 
Protestant Reformation made the individual believer the judge 
of religious truth ("God Alone is Lord of the Conscience") and 
thus made freedom of thought a pressing question for all 
thinking individuals.12 Religion and religious freedom were 
therefore at the very heart of the liberal project. Liberalism 
meant many things, but above all it meant that every person 
has the freedom to worship God in accordance with the dictates 
of his own conscience. This was the key to achieving both 
freedom of the mind and civil peace. 
Initially, liberalism was understood principally in terms of 
what we would now call 'limited government": government 
must be confined to certain limited ends and the rest would be 
left to private persons in the private sphere.13 As applied to 
religion, this meant that the magistrate was given no power to 
superintend the spiritual health of the citizens. As applied to 
the economic sphere, this would lead to the belief in a free- 
market economy; but it is important to realize that the 
implications of liberalism for religion were older than-and 
philosophically prior to-the realization of its implications for 
economics. Milton and Locke developed sophisticated theories 
of religious freedom more than a century before Adam Smith 
brought us the theory of the free market. 
Liberalism was favorably received, especially on this side 
of the Atlantic, in part because of its consistency with two 
central teachings of Protestant Christianity.14 The first of 
these is the two-kingdoms theology of Augustinian t h o u g h t a  
12. Of course, there are many other factors that contributed to the rise of 
liberalism. For example, the ensuing diversity of beliefs resulting from the 
Protestant Reformation also gave rise to ruinous religious conflicts in most of the 
European nations of the seventeenth century. My intention here is not to provide a 
comprehensive intellectual history, but to call attention to the close connection 
between liberalism and the question of religion. 
13. The classic text is JOHN UCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CML 
GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed. 1956) (1690). See particularly chapter M, at 63-66. 
14. On the co~ections between Protestant religious developments and religious 
toleration in Britain and the States, see W m  R. ESTEP, REVOLUTION WITHIN 
THE REVOLUTION (1990), and MICHAEL R. WATTS, THE DISSENTERS: FROM THE 
REFORMATION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1978). See also WILLIAM G. 
MCLOUGHLIN, EW ENGLAND ISSENT: 1630-1833 (1971). 
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theology carried forward in different ways by Luther and by 
the Calvinist Reformed tradition to  which our Puritan and 
Presbyterian forebears adhered.15 The two-kingdoms theology 
conceived of man as owing allegiance to  two different sets of 
authorities, the spiritual and the temporal. "God has appointed 
two kinds of government in the world,"16 explained Isaac 
Backus, a Baptist leader and one of the most influential 
advocates of religious freedom at the Founding. These 
governments "are distinct in their nature, and ought never to 
be confounded together; one of -which is called civil, the other 
ecclesiastical government."" Religious freedom, in this view, 
involved the jurisdictional separation of these two sets of 
authorities. Connecticut preacher Elisha Williams drew an 
analogy to one king attempting to govern the people of another 
kingdom: 
[Ilf CHRIST be the Lord of the conscience, the sole King in his 
own kingdom; then it will follow, that all such as in any 
manner or degree assume the power of directing and 
governing the consciences of men, are justly chargeable with 
invading his rightful dominion; He alone having the right 
they claim. Should the king of France take it into his head to 
prescribe laws to the subjects of the king of Great Britain; 
who would not say, it was an invasion of and insult offer'd to 
the British legi~lature.'~ 
The state should thus confine itself to  matters of worldly 
concern, so as not to  invade the province of the spiritual 
sovereign.lg 
While theological in its origin, the two-kingdoms idea lent 
15. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 376-77 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950); 2 
JOHN CALVIN, I N S T ~ E S  OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 184 (Ford L. Battle ed. & 
trans., 1975); 45 MARTIN LUTHER, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should 
Be Obeyed, in LUTHER'S WORKS 75, 81-129 (Walther I. Brandt ed. & J.J. Schindel 
trans., 1962); see generally ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION 
DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3, 56-57 (1990). 
16. ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), 
reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 334 (Ellis 
Sandoz ed., 1991) [hereinafter POLITICAL SERMONS]. 
17. Id. at 335. 
18. ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL R I G ~ S  AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS 
(1744), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 16, a t  51, 65-66. 
19. Locke defends a similar position in his Letters on Religious Tolemtwn, 
though primarily in the interest of civil harmony. See Michael W. McConnell, The 
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1409, 1430-35 (1990). 
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powerful support to a more general liberal theory of 
government, because once the government could be limited in 
one respect, it could be limited in others. The state could no 
longer be understood as omnicompetent. This idea provided 
probably the most important counterweight to the common 
Enlightenment belief that the best form of government was 
enlightened despotism. It can be argued that of the two great 
intellectual upheavals of the early modern period, the 
Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation, the latter was 
the more signdkant for the advance of political liberty. Of 
course, much blood was spilled for conscience-not least by, 
Protestants-before these implications of Protestant doctrine 
became apparent and ultimately dominant. 
The two-kingdoms view of competing authorities is at the 
heart of our First Amendment. The first paragraph of the most 
important document explaining the Founders' conception of 
religious freedom, James Madison's Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reasons as 
follows: "It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator 
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to 
him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of 
obligation, to  the claims of Civil So~ie ty ."~~ So we have duties 
to God, and duties to civil society, and the duties to God are 
precedent both in time and also in importance. Madison 
continued: 
Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil 
Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of 
the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters 
into any subordinate Association, must also do it with a 
reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more 
must every man who becomes a member of any particular 
Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the 
Universal So~ereign.~' 
Here we see the confluence of Lockean social contract theory 
and two-kingdoms theology: Madison understands the civil 
authority as constituted by consent of the governed and the 
spiritual authority as ordained by the Universal Sovereign. 
20. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS 5 1 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1, 64 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. 
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Significantly, Madison gives precedence to the latter over the 
former. Religious freedom is both necessary and inalienable 
because it follows from the duties owed to God by His 
creatures. , Indeed, religion is defined in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights as "the duty which we owe to our 
C r e a t ~ r . " ~ ~  Men have no right to consent to civil government 
that would stand in the way of their duties to the Universal 
Sovereign. "It would be sinful for a man to surrender that to 
man which is to be kept sacred for God," according to Madison's 
constituent, the Baptist leader John Leland.23 
The second theological notion that  paved the way for 
liberalism was the emerging concept of what the Baptists 
called "soul liberty." This is the belief that faith, to be valid and 
acceptable t o  God, must be uncoerced. Under this view, it is 
literally impossible as a theological matter for government 
power to improve a citizen's spiritual state. In the words of 
Elisha Williams: 
That faith and practice which depends on the judgment and 
choice of any other person, and not on the person's own 
understanding judgment and choice, may pass for religion in 
the synagogue of Satan, whose tenet is that ignorance is the 
mother of devotion; but with no understanding Protestant will 
it pass for any religion at all. No action is a religious action 
without understanding and choice in the agent.24 
The idea of soul liberty derives from the doctrine of salvation 
through grace: the only way that unregenerate man can come 
to faith and salvation is through the intervention of God. It is 
worse than useless-it is blasphemous-for an outside party, 
the government for example, to presume to supplant the free 
act of God.25 
22. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776) (emphasis added), reprinted 
in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HIS~ORY 103, 104 (Henry S. Commager ed., 9th ed. 
1973). 
23. JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in 
POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 16, at 1079, 1085. For an account of Leland's 
critical role in persuading Madison to sponsor a religious freedom provision in a 
Bill of Rights, see Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A 
Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 323-24. 
24. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 62. This is only one of numerous sermons and 
religious tracts making a similar point. 
25. Tbis is closely associated in Protestant doctrine with the idea that God's 
revelation to man through the scriptures is perfect and accessible to all, and 
should be the sole authority for faith and practice. Thus, Elisha Williams 
maintained that 
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. The soul liberty doctrine is reflected in the foundational 
documents of the First Amendment. I t  is revealing that the 
Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, authored by 
Thomas Jefferson and shepherded through the General 
Assembly by James Madison, begins with a theological 
proposition: 
Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that 
all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or 
burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits 
of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the 
plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both 
of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions 
on either . . . .26 
God created the mind free; though being "Lord of body and 
mind," He chose not to propagate faith through coercion; 
attempts to influence religious faith through government power 
are inconsistent with God's plan; a coerced faith is invalid and 
unacceptable to God-these are not secular arguments. The 
pen may have been Jefferson's but the content came from the 
revival tents of Baptist enthusiasts; the Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom is based on Protestant doctrine. 
The soul liberty idea also paved the way for a broader 
conception of liberalism. Just  as the two-kingdoms theology 
points in the direction of limited government, the doctrine of 
soul liberty implies and leads to liberty in general, or to the 
"pursuit of Happiness," as it is put in the Declaration of 
Independen~e.~' In other words, each person is free to pursue 
the good life in the manner and season most agreeable to his or 
her conscience, which is the voice of God. If God did not 
exercise His omnipotent power to coerce Adam and Eve to live 
according to His precepts, He must have wanted mankind to be 
free creatures. Surely no earthly authority has a better claim to 
rule than God Himself. I t  is no accident that peoples who 
it is impossible to be true that any can have right or authority to oblige 
Christians to' believe or practice any thing in religion not true or not 
agreeable to the word of GOD: Because that would destroy the sacred 
scriptures from being the only rule of faith and practice in religion to a 
Christian. 
Id. at 73. 
26. Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty 5 1 (1786), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS 
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supm note 22, at 125. 
27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (US. 1776). 
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accepted Protestant theology were the first to accept liberal 
political theory. No one would have said that liberalism a t  the 
time of the Founding was inconsistent with or hostile to 
religious freedom, for religious freedom was one of its principal 
commitments and preoccupations. 
111. MODERN LIBERALISM AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
At its beginning, then, liberalism was intellectually 
connected t o  religious thought and strongly supportive of 
religious freedom. But matters did not stay that way. As 
liberalism developed, it departed from its religious roots. Three 
particular developments had especially important implications 
for religious freedom. 
A. Liberalism As Ideology 
The first is that liberalism, understood as limited govern- 
ment, gave way to liberalism understood as an ideology-the 
advocacy of a particular way of life. A liberal regime requires 
liberal citizens. Liberal citizens are those with liberal virtues. 
What are the liberal virtues? There are a number of answers 
that could be given to this question:8 but among them, surely, 
are the virtues of individualism, independence, and rationality. 
It is not my intention to  criticize individualism, independence, 
or rationality, all of which, properly understood, can be excel- 
lences of the human being as well as of the liberal citizen. But 
like all human characteristics, they are susceptible to misun- 
derstanding and distortion, and so misunderstood these three 
virtues are in tension with the religious way of life. 
Religion is typically more communitarian than individual- 
istic. It calls for a transcending of self. The good life, seen 
through the eyes of biblical religion, is one of mutual obligation 
and submission. The commandment is to love God, and to love 
your neighbor as yourself;zg the last will be first:' and to  
lose one's life is to find it.31 Individualism can be threatening 
to  the religious sensibility because-understood in a particular 
way-it can foster and legitimate selfishness, self-love, even 
28. See the various answers given in the essays in VIRTUE (John W. Chapman 
& William A. Galston eds., Nomos XXXIV, 1992). 
29. Luke 10:27. 
30. Matthew 19:30. 
31. Matthew 10:39. 
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self-worship. The idea of independence or autonomy, similarly, 
can conflict with the conviction that we do not choose but we 
are chosen by God, whose law governs the universe. It is close- 
ly akin to pride, which is the deadliest of the theological vices. 
Autonomy, too, can become a perversion of conscience: con- 
science is the ability and responsibility of each individual to 
conform to the dictates of the moral order, while autonomy 
requires conformity to no one but oneself. And rationalism can 
easily be understood as opposed to faith and tradition. It can 
degenerate into skepticism and nihilism, the ultimate irratio- 
nality. 
From a secular point of view, it is difficult t o  appreciate 
the religious impulse. Faith seems antithetical to  reason and 
obedience t o  higher authority seems submissive and antidemo- 
cratic. A liberalism based on individualism, independence, and 
rationalism thus has a tendency to  see traditional religion as 
authoritarian, irrational, and divisive-as a potential threat t o  
our democratic  institution^^^ rather than as one of their stur- 
diest pillars, as was typically thought at the F ~ u n d i n g . ~ ~  To- 
day, it is not unusual to find law professors writing that reli- 
gions "undermine rather than mutually reinforce habits of 
mind necessary for democratic decision-making,"34 or that reli- 
gion is "fundamentally incompatible with [the] intellectual 
cornerstone of the modern democratic state."35 Justice John 
Paul Stevens has called religions "divisive forces" and told us 
that it is vital to keep these forces out of our public 
schools-even when the religious activity in question is volun- 
tary, extracurricular, and student-initiated.36 This, he says, is 
because the schools are "the symbol of our democracy and the 
32. For a particularly forthright statement of this view, see William P. Mar- 
shall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (1993). 
33. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEMLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (J.P. Mayer 
ed., 1969) (reporting that Americans considered religion "necessary to the mainte- 
nance of republican institutions" and that he had come to  agree with them); 
WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS (Sept. 17, 1796), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 22, at 169, 173 (religion is the "indispensable sup- 
port[]" for republican government). 
34. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against 
Discriminatory Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 598 (1991). 
35. Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation 
of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. F'I'IT. L. REV. 
75, 174 (1990). 
36. Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 US. 226, 287 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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most pervasive means of promoting our common destiny."37 
Needless to say, modem liberals see no need to keep other 
"divisive forces" out of the schools. Indeed they are the first to 
protest "censorship" when Soul on Ice or books containing vul- 
gar and offensive language are removed from the curricu- 
1 ~ ~ . ~ ~  
With such a change in perspective, freedom of religion 
came to be seen as less important than freedom from religion. 
I t  is revealing that Felix Frankfurter, the prototypical liberal of 
this school, described religious freedom as "freedom from con- 
formity to religious dogma,"39 and Justice Harry Blackmun 
describes the Establishment Clause as protecting "secular liber- 
ty" (not "religious liberty").40 This is a far cry from those who 
understood religious freedom as willing obedience to the sover- 
eignty of God, and gave it pride of place in our First Amend- 
ment. 
The shift from liberalism-as-limited-government to liberal- 
ism-as-ideology has been both obscured and exacerbated by the 
pretense that i t  is merely being "neutral" among competing 
conceptions of the good life. Somehow, "neutral" came to mean 
"secular9'-as if agnosticism about the theistic foundations of 
the universe were common ground among believers and nonbe- 
lievers alike. Religion (like other direct human experiences) is 
unverifiable and unfalsifiable, and secular liberals naively 
believed that this distinguished i t  from other ways of thinking 
about the world, which were assumed to be free of this 
epistemological flaw. Secular, "objective," reasoning was the 
neutral starting point; any religious reasoning was "controver- 
sial," "subjective," and-in public matters-inappropriate. 
Thus, in any controversy in which secular liberals sought to 
include one book in the curriculum and remove another, while 
their religious opponents sought to remove that book and in- 
clude the other, it was always the latter who were said to be 
"interjecting" their beliefs into the curriculum.41 The secular 
37. Id. 
38. See the briefs filed in support of the respondent in Board of Education v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). For a description of the materials in controversy, see id. 
at 897-903 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Powell, J.). 
39. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) (Frank- 
furter, J., dissenting). 
40. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (quoting Larson v. 
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (quoting BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE L?+MERICAN REVOLUTION 265 (1967))). 
41. Cases in which secular liberals successfully sought removal of books over 
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liberals were being neutral and nonsectarian-no matter how 
offensive and unfounded their choice of curriculum might seem 
to persons of a different mindset. 
B. Toleration As Indifference 
A parallel development was that liberalism came to be 
associated with the idea that individuals have no legitimate 
interest in the attitudes, opinions, and character of others with- 
in the community. Thus, the state was limited in its power over 
the individual conscience not because conscience is too impor- 
tant to brook government control, but because the consciences 
of others do not affect our lives. Jefferson could say that  "it 
does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty 
gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my 
leg,"" without finding it necessary to distinguish between his 
interests as a citizen and his interests as a person. However, to 
the evangelical Christians who spearheaded the drive for reli- 
gious liberty in the United States, such a distinction was all- 
important. They could agree that  the state should stay out of 
the business of saving souls, but it mattered deeply and in- 
tensely what their neighbors believed. That was why the evan- 
gelicals spent so much time evangelizing. That was the spirit of 
the Great Awakening. 
The problem with the proposition that the individual is not 
affected in any serious way by the character and beliefs of 
others is that it is manifestly not true. Obviously we are affect- 
ed by such issues of character as whether our neighbors are  
racists, sexists, respectful of the environment, tolerant, indus- 
trious, or civil. We have no hesitation today in using state 
power to inculcate beliefs and attitudes that we deem impor- 
tant to our life together. We do not wait until bad attitudes and 
antisocial principles "break out into overt acts against peace 
religious protests include Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992) (upholding the removal of two books, THE BIBLE IN 
PICTURES and THE STORY OF JESUS from a classroom library), and Coleman v. 
Caddo Parish School Board, No. 385,230 (1st Jud. Dist. Ct., Caddo Parish, La., 
1993) (ordering removal of abstinence-based sex education curricula entitled "Sex 
Respect" and "Racing Reality" from public schools). Cases in which religious and 
traditionalist parents unsuccessfully sought removal of books over liberal protests 
include Board of Education v. Pico, 457 US. 853 (1982), and Smith v. Board of 
School Commissioners, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). 
42. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 159 William Peden 
ed., 1955) (1787). 
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and good order."43 We design our curricula and redesign our 
institutions to bring about desired changes in attitude. This 
has created the strange phenomenon of modem liberalism: a 
liberalism that still proclaims its neutrality toward competing 
ideas of virtue and the good life, but is committed in practice to 
the promotion of particular ideals and-even more-to the 
eradication of others. In practice, liberals are neutral only 
about matters toward which they are indifferent." 
Fortunately, modern liberals are usually indifferent toward 
religion, a t  least as long as it stays in its place. Thus, there can 
be widespread agreement that members of the Native Ameri- 
can Church should be permitted to ingest peyote in the privacy 
of their distant hogansp5 and even that practitioners of 
Santeria should enjoy no less freedom to kill animals than 
hunters already enjoy? But when churches stand against 
principles or interests with more popular currency-when they 
forbid interracial dating in their schools4' or refuse to employ 
mothers with small children outside the home4'-they are 
unanimously rebuffed by the Supreme Court and scarcely a 
voice is lifted on their behalf. Even before the recent shift in 
interpretation of the Free Exercise C lau~e ;~  free exercise cas- 
es were almost always losers: virtually any plausible public 
purpose was deemed sufficient to override the right of religious 
exercise." If religious freedom is confined to those aspects of 
our practice that are of no interest or concern to our neighbors, 
it does not amount to much. 
43. Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, supra note 26, # 1. 
44. This is what Stanley Fish calls his first law of tolerance dynamics: "Toler- 
ance is exercised in an inverse proportion to there being anything at  stake." Stan- 
ley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posnefs Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1447, 1466 (1990). 
45. An impressive array of civil liberties organizations and academics (including 
this author) joined in support of a petition for rehearing in Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
46. A similarly impressive array of civil liberties organizations joined in an 
amicus curiae brief (written by this author) in support of the petitioners in Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
47. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
48. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1987). 
49. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
50. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Deci- 
sion, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1127 (1990). 
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C. The End Of Limited Government 
The third important development is that liberalism ceased 
to be understood as standing for limited government. Welfare- 
state liberalism has so eclipsed Lockean liberalism that the 
latter is no longer even denominated "liberalism" in common 
speech. With the rise of the welfare-regulatory state, the 
spheres of religion and government were no longer distant and 
distinct (with the government in charge of commerce and civil 
order and the churches in charge of charity and the inculcation 
of goodness and truth); the state extended its regulatory juris- 
diction over broad aspects of life that formerly had been private 
and frequently religious, creating conflicts both with religious 
institutions and with the religiously motivated activity of indi- 
viduals. The government could regulate the church itself: whom 
it could hire:' for what hours and at what salary," what in- 
ternal rules it could enforce,s3 what it could teach the children 
of its believers,s4 and so forth. As government expands, con- 
flicts between religious and public values proliferate. 
It should be remembered that when the ~ i r s t  Amendment 
was proposed and ratified, the government had little or no 
involvement in education, social welfare, or the formation and 
transmission of culture. These functions were predominantly 
left to the private sphere, and within the private sphere reli- 
gious institutions played a leading role. As the government has 
assumed wider and wider responsibility for the funding and 
regulation of these functions, the idea of a "secular state" has 
become more and more ominous. When the state is the domi- 
nant influence in the culture, a "secular state" becomes equiva- 
lent to a secular culture. Religious influences are confined to 
those segments of society in which the government is not in- 
51. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 456 US. 905 (1982). But see Corporation of the Presiding Bish- 
op v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a statutory 
exemption that permits churches to hire from within their faith, for functions that 
are nonprofit in nature). Previously, the Free Exercise Clause protected churches to 
some degree in this area, see Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986), but it 
is doubtful that this protection survived Smith. 
52. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
53. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Guinn v. Church of 
Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989). 
54. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 301 N.W.2d 571, app. 
dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981). 
178 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNXVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
volved, which is to say that religion is confined to the margins 
of public life-to those areas not important enough to have 
received the helping or controlling hand of government. 
Nowhere is this development more evident than in the 
field of education. It is no accident that a large proportion of all 
religion cases in the Supreme Court have involved schools, for 
the takeover of education by the government has been the most 
profound cultural change in American history. At the Found- 
ing, almost all education-primary, secondary, and high- 
er-was under religious auspices. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, 
William and Mary, Amherst, Williams-all were Christian 
institutions in substance as well as in name through much of 
the nineteenth Century and in some cases into the twentieth. 
As late as the 1840s, Tocqueville reported that almost all lower 
schools were taught by ministers of the gospel.55 I t  was only 
in the 1840s that government-operated schools gained a monop- 
oly on public funding in the large cities (after tumultuous con- 
troversy between the Protestant elite and the largely Catholic 
immigrant classes, who fought vainly for a pluralistic educa- 
tional system). By the close of the century, government-operat- 
ed schools dominated the field of basic education, the only 
holdouts being the Catholic schools and a scattering of Jewish, 
Dutch Reformed, Lutheran, Quaker, and upper-class private 
schools. 
Moreover, educational reformers were more than willing to 
use their new-found control over the education of the youth to 
inculcate a cultural ideal, often called by nineteenth-century 
reformers "Americanism," based on democratic patriotism, 
liberal Protestantism, and the virtues of hard work, self-disci- 
pline, and self-reliance. Through education the liberal reform- 
ers would assimilate the millions of newer immigrants, fre- 
quently Catholics and Jews, into the American way of life, 
which included a reasonable, non-sectarian, watered-down, 
Protestant religion. This was accomplished over the objections 
of not just Catholics and Jews, but of more traditional evangeli- 
cal Protestants, none of whom could understand why "public" 
schools should be dominated by the values and ideology of only 
one segment of the p ~ p u l a t i o n . ~ ~  
55. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 295 n.4. 
56. For descriptions of these struggles, see CHARLES L. GLENN, JR., THE MYTH 
OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS, NEW 
YORK CITY, 1805-1973: A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS BATTLEFIELD OF 
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More recently, twentieth century educational reformers 
have pursued the same project in a more secular hue, no less 
offensive to traditionalist Catholics, Protestants, and Jews but 
lacking the overt connection to liberal Protestantism. John 
Dewey, for example, contended that the public schools have a n  
"ethical responsibility" to inculcate social values derived from 
scientific and democratic principles and to convert children 
away from the superstitions of their families.57 Bruce 
Ackerman argues that a goal of "liberal education" is "to pro- 
vide the child with cultural materials" in her resistance to 
parental values so that she "may forge the beginnings of a n  
identity that deviates from parental norms."58 Unlike Dewey, 
Ackerman does not claim that the new "values" are better or 
more "scientific" than the old, but maintains that this is a 
"neutral" way to build liberal citizens who will think for them- 
selves. A genuinely neutral education would, of course, work 
both ways-undermining the unbelief of the unbeliever as well 
as  the belief of the believer. Ackerman, however, does not ap- 
pear to have considered the possibility that  the schools be used 
to "provide the child with cultural materials" to overcome the 
lack of values in the home, nor does he advocate mandatory 
religious education for the children of atheist parents.5g The 
most recent trend is to use the school for the inculcation of 
what is called "multi-culturalism," which in practice is not 
multi-cultural at all, but simply another distinct ideological 
position hostile to the traditional culture. Education increasing- 
ly seems to promote a new set of values no less sectarian than 
the old: environmentalism, safe sex, opposition to whatever is 
thought to be racism and sexism, sexual freedom, and a critical 
posture toward the role of the West in the oppression of the 
rest of the world. 
It should be obvious to anyone who ponders the matter 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1974); Michael W. M c c o ~ e u ,  Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, 
and Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 
1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123, 134-39. 
57. JOHN DEWEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION 7-10 (1975). 
58. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 153 (1980). 
59. I do not imply that such affirmative teaching would be either possible or 
desirable. What "values" should the schools inculcate? What religion should they 
teach? Who should decide? If Ackerman were genuinely concerned about neutrality, 
he would be forced to grapple with these issues, for while undermining the affir- 
mative teachings of the home is easy, introducing serious moral and religious alter- 
natives is far more d=cult. Ackerman, however, is silent about this. His "neutrali- 
ty" seems purely negative and destructive. 
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that education cannot possibly be "neutral" toward all compet- 
ing points of view. Which historical figures should be profiled 
as "role models" in our textbooks? Columbus? Jefferson? Sitting 
Bull? Robert E. Lee? Brigham Young? Malcolm X? Sara 
Weddington? Mother Theresa? How do we teach biology? Cre- 
ationism either is,60 or it is not:' an  intellectually respect- 
able challenge to Darwinian evolution. To include the 
creationist challenge is to give it legitimacy; to exclude it is to 
privilege the Darwinian orthodoxy and to shelter it from criti- 
cal evaluation. How do we teach about sex? To some, sexual 
modesty and shame are bulwarks against immorality; to oth- 
ers, sexual modesty and shame are obstacles to premeditated 
contraception. The first task of sex education is to break down 
that sense of shame so that teenagers will feel comfortable 
about discussing, procuring, and using contraceptives: that is 
why sex education is so controversial. We do not know whether 
to teach virtue or not, and we do not know what virtues to 
teach. Love, faithfulness, and obedience? Or autonomy and self- 
a~sertion?~' Which is immoral: homosexuality or the belief 
that homosexuality is immoral? 
The answer, in modern liberal America, is that these is- 
sues will be fought out in the political and professional arenas 
and the dominant factions will win-except that religiously 
oriented viewpoints are excluded from the outset. In the  mar- 
ketplace of ideas, only those tainted by religion are, from the 
outset, denied a place. 
Studies by the National Institute for Education, People for 
the American Way, Americans United for Separation Between 
Church and State, and the Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development have been surprisingly uniform in 
their finding that religion has been systematically excluded 
from the public school curriculum, including such subjects as 
history, social studies, and humanities, where it unquestion- 
ably plays a part.63 Educational psychologist Paul Vitz, who 
60. See generally PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991). 
61. See generally PHILIP KTTCHER, ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST ' CRE- 
ATIONISM (1982); MICHAEL RUSE, DARWINISM DEFENDED: A GUIDE TO THE EVOLU- 
TION CONTROVERSIES (1982). 
62. See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of 
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 467-68 (1992) ("[Slelf- 
sacrifice is often women's sin . . . . A woman's greatest temptation is to hide her 
talents rather than develop them, sacrificing her development as an autonomous 
self in order to serve others."). 
63. 0.L. DAVIS, JR., ET AL., LOOKING AT HISTORY: A REVIEW OF MAJOR U.S. 
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conducted the most comprehensive such study of elementary 
and secondary school curricula, concluded: 
public school textbooks commonly exclude the history, heri- 
tage, beliefs, and values of millions of Americans. Those who 
believe in the traditional family are not represented. Those 
who believe in free enterprise are not represented. Those 
whose politics are conservative are almost unrepresented. 
Above all, those who are committed to their religious tradi- 
tion-at the very least as an important part of the historical 
record-are not repre~ented?~ 
One can go through elementary and secondary school today and 
not be aware that religion has played-and still plays-a major 
role in history, philosophy, science, and the ordinary lives of 
many millions of Americans. I sense the effect in my own ele- 
mentary school-age children: they wonder how I can think God 
and Jesus Christ are so important to the workings of nature 
and history when they never hear about such things in school. 
A secular school does not necessarily produce atheists, but it 
produces young adults who inevitably think of religion as ex- 
traneous to the real world of intellectual inquiry, if they think 
of religion at all. 
Liberal neutrality, it turns out, is of a very peculiar sort. 
And what has occurred in education has also occurred, perhaps 
less brazenly, in other areas of life that have come under gov- 
ernment control. The government sphere is rarely overtly hos- 
tile to religion. But by its silence, coupled with its receptivity to  
competing secular ideologies, the government has become a 
major factor in the secularization of society. 
That is where liberalism brought us. What does post-mod- 
ernism have to say to  this situation? 
IV. POST-MODERNISM: CORRECTIVE OR AGGRAVANT? 
Post-modemism is more a congeries of attitudes and ideol- 
ogies than it is a single, coherent philosophical position. It has 
usefully been defined as embodying four interrelated concepts: 
HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 3-4, 11 (1987); CHARLES C. HAYNEs, A TEACHER'S GUIDE: RELI- 
GIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 6 (1986); PAUL C. VlTZ, RELIGION AND TRADITIONAL 
VALUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL TEICI'BOOKS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 3-7 (1985); Educators 
Urge Turn to Studies About Religion, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1987, at A16 (report of 
the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development). 
64. PAUL C. VITZ, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S TEXT- 
BOOKS 22 (1986). 
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(1) The self is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-gener- 
ating entity; i t  is purely a social, cultural, historical, and 
linguistic creation. (2)  There are no foundational principles 
from which other assertions can be derived; hence, certainty 
as the result of either empirical verification or deductive rea- 
soning is impossible. (3) There can be no such thing as knowl- 
edge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always belief 
and can apply only to the context within which it is asserted. 
(4) Because language is socially and culturally constituted, it 
is inherently incapable of representing or corresponding to 
reality; hence all propositions and all interpretations,. even 
texts, are themselves social  construction^.^^ 
For present purposes, the central insight of post-modernism is 
the exposure of liberalism as  just another ideology. What post- 
modernists have taught us is that the supposed neutrality 
often claimed for liberalism is really only a mask for a system 
and a way of life that now seems to post-modernists to be 
based upon patriarchal, white, male, European, and bourgeois 
interests and values. There is no neutral, objective vantage 
point from which to view the world; we are all prisoners of our 
own perspectives; the beginning of wisdom is to recognize the 
potential worth and value of others different from ourselves. 
In this sense, advocates of religious freedom should find 
much to commend in post-modernism? If "what we think of 
as  knowledge is always belief," then religion can reenter the 
serious world of intellectual inquiry on a presumptively equal 
footing-one belief against another, and let's see which offers 
the most persuasive account of the human experience-not 
because its status has improved, but because its positivist corn- 
65. Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications 
for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992). For a more 
extensive examination of the meaning of post-modernism, see CHARLES JENCKS, 
WHAT IS POST-MODERNISM? (1986). 
66. I do not mean that adherents to traditional biblical religion should (or 
could) find post-modernism congenial as a philosophical proposition. The denial of 
any objective basis for knowledge seems incompatible with the belief in a God who 
has revealed Himself to mankind, and the denial of the objectivity of any text 
seems incompatible with the view that the scriptures can be the perfect guide to 
faith and practice. My point is simply that a world dominated by post-modernists 
might be thought less likely to treat religious modes of thinking as outside the 
bounds of reasonable discourse, since post-modernists believe there are no such 
bounds. On the prospects for a postmodern theology, see Nancy Murphy & James 
W. McClendon, Jr., Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies, 5 MODERN 
THEOLOGY 191 (1989). 
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petitors have been stripped of their epistemological advantage. 
Given its message that secular liberalism is no longer entitled 
to a privileged place on account of its ostensible neutrality, 
post-modernism would appear to augur a revitalization of reli- 
gious freedom. In a post-modernist world, maybe religious ways 
of thought could be restored to legitimacy and cease to be 
rnarginal i~ed.~~ As Professor Fred Gedicks has stated: 
If this post-modern insight is correct, then secularism 
has no exclusive claim as the language of American public 
life. Public religious discourse was discredited as arbitrary 
subjectivity by a secular critique that pretends to be neutral 
and objective, but which beneath that pretense is itself arbi- 
trary and subjective. There can no longer be any empirical 
argument for keeping religious discourse out of public life.68 
Why, then, does it seem not to work out that way? Why is 
it that most of the post-modernist movements that  we see in  
law-critical legal studies, feminism, critical race theory and so 
forth-seem by and large in their actual political activity to be 
hostile and detrimental to religious freedom? Post-modernism, 
it turns out, represents not just a critique of liberalism but an 
intensification and exacerbation of the very features of liberal- 
ism that created the conflict with freedom of religion. 
A. The Attack On The Public-Private Distinction 
If welfare state liberalism supplanted the earlier under- 
standing of liberalism as limited government, post-modernism 
takes us a n  additional step. Post-modernism tells us that the 
very distinction between the public and the private is incoher- 
ent and destructive. A common feature of the post-modern 
jurisprudential movements is the attack on the public-private 
distinction, especially as it bears upon the constitutional doc- 
trine of state actiodg If the contours of "the private sphere" 
67. One sees this, at  times, in Stanley Fish. See Stanley Fish, Liberalism 
Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997. 
68. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 
CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 137 (1991); see also Charles Davis, Religion and the Making 
of Society, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 718, 729 (1987) (arguing, on post-modernist grounds, 
that religion "is a critical foundation for the permanent argument that constitutes 
political society"). 
69. See, e-g., Charles R. Lawrence 111, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444-45; Frances E. Olsen, The 
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
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(for example, private property) are socially constructed, then 
any decision by the state to protect "the private9'-or even to 
leave it alone-is a political decision; it is "state action." If the 
state chooses to allow a private club t o  discriminate (when it 
could just as easily forbid the discrimination), that is "state 
action." If a poor person starves, it is not the result of imper- 
sonal forces but of the state's failure to redistribute resources. 
If the state fails t o  prevent domestic violence (perhaps because 
of a misguided respect for the "privacy" of the home) it is a 
social failure. 
Yet the public-private distinction (the state action doctrine) 
is utterly indispensable to a theory of religious freedom. We 
cannot have religious freedom without it. The very same con- 
duct can be either constitutionally protected or constitutionally 
forbidden, depending on whether those who engage in it are 
acting in their "private" or their "public" capacities. If a group 
of people get together and form a church, that is the free exer- 
cise of religion. If the government gets together and forms a 
church, that is an establishment of religion. One is protected; 
one is forbidden. It is inconceivable that we could construct a 
theory of freedom of religion which does not distinguish at 
some level between the activities of the individual believer and 
the activities of the sovereign. 
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. A n o ~ , ~ '  for ex- 
ample, the government made an exception to its employment 
discrimination laws allowing churches to hire members of their 
own faith. This was challenged as an establishment of religion, 
but the Court upheld it. The pre-post-modernist majority naive- 
ly asserted that a "law is not unconstitutional simply because it 
allows churches to advance religion, which is their very pur- 
pose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must 
be fair to  say that the government itself has advanced religion 
through its own activities and infl~ence."~~ Justice O'Connor, 
evidently influenced by post-modernist thinking, explained that 
this analysis seemed 
1497 (1983); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 
1195-1206 (1985); Symposium on The Public-Private Distinction, 130 U .  PA. L. REV. 
1289 (1982). For an earlier statement of the position, applied to religion, see KARL 
IMARX, On the Jewish &uestion, in 3 KARL MARX, FREDERICK ENGELS, COLLECTED 
WORKS 146, 160-68 (International Publishers 1975). 
70. 483 US. 327 (1987). 
71. Id. at 337. 
1631 POST-MODERN FREEDOM OF RELIGION 185 
to obscure far more than to enlighten. Almost any government 
benefit to religion could be recharacterized as simply 
"allowing" a religion to better advance itself. . . . The Church 
had the power to [force its employees to conform to the church 
or lose their jobs] because the Government had lifted from 
religious organizations the general regulatory burden imposed 
by [the civil rights 
This is a restatement of the familiar deconstruction of the pub- 
lic-private distinction. If there is no difference between govern- 
ment "lifting a regulatory burden" (that is, not interfering with 
private action) and government conferring an affirmative bene- 
fit, then there is no difference, in principle, between guarantee- 
ing the free exercise of religion and erecting an establishment. 
Less obviously, but to the same effect, Justice Breman 
argued that the Amos case presented a "confrontation between 
the rights of religious organizations and those of individu- 
al~." '~ This, too, is a denial of the force of the public-private 
distinction. It treats as equivalent "rights" the freedom of a 
religious community to choose for itself who its agents are t o  
be, and the "right" of an outsider to invoke the coercive power 
of the state to force the religious community to  hire him. It 
presupposes that an individual's "rights" run equally against 
public and private institutions. 
Once the public-private distinction is obliterated-once 
private power and public power are treated as equally threat- 
ening and once the government is understood to act whenever 
it refrains from interfering with the acts of private individu- 
als-religious freedom cases become hopelessly indeterminate. 
Thus, Justice O'Connor is forced to decide the Amos case on the 
72. Id. at 347 (O'Comor, J., concurring in the judgment). This argument was 
echoed by Professor Mark Tushnet, the leading Critical Legal Studies theorist in 
the field of religious freedom: "One might respond, of course, that the government 
indeed put the Church in a position to put [the employee] to that choice by reliev- 
ing the Church of its obligation to comply with the general antidiscrimination re- 
quirement." Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion 
(Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1705 (1988). Tushnet's interjection, "of course," 
shows just how obvious post-modernist thinking now seems to post-modernists. 
Non-post-modernists might be tempted to respond that "of course" Tushnet's state- 
ment presupposes, incorrectly, that the government has the rightful authority to 
impose a legal obligation on the Church to hire unbelievers. 
73. Amos, 483 U.S. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). This 
argument, too, was echoed by Professor Tushnet. Tushnet, supra note 72, at 1705 
("Accommodating one interestthat  o f .  . . the employee in Amos-necessarily 
impairs the same religious interest on the other side"). 
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basis of an  utterly contentless "endorsement test" (the Religion 
Clauses' equivalent of "we know it when we see it"),74 and 
Justice Brennan is forced to give precedence to institutional 
over individual free exercise rights-which might be correct, 
but is hardly self-evident and which, under the majority ap- 
proach, is unnecessary to decide. 
B. Tolerance And The Debunking Of Neutrality 
A second reason that modem liberalism ceased to be con- 
sistent with a robust notion of religious liberty was that liberal- 
ism turned out not to be merely a neutral arbiter among com- 
peting understandings of the good life, but to embody certain 
substantive principles, among them individualism, indepen- 
dence, and rationality. Now that has been unmasked by post- 
modernists. What happens next? 
For the most part, with some exceptions, post-modernists 
in  the legal and political arenas have treated the debunking of 
liberal neutrality as an  opportunity for partisanship in the 
service of a controversial vision of liberation. As one academic 
commentator on post-modernism has observed: 
Many [post-modernists] are political activists and political 
advocates. They adopt positive political positions based on 
explicitly stated values and goals. They move from 
deconstruction and reconstruction to construction, despite the 
intellectual logical contradiction involved in denying modern 
foundations and then positing one's own vision as in some 
ways ''better."75 
Thus, while multi-culturalism and political correctness may 
seem to be logically incompatible positions, they often are 
found in the same people. The logical path seems to be as fob 
lows: If there is no objective standard of truth, there is no need 
to worry that opposing viewpoints might have something im- 
portant to say; and since there is no basis for persuasion by the 
intrinsic merit of argument, all that is left is the exercise of 
74. For demonstrations that the "endorsement" test has no determinative con- 
tent, see Michael W. McCo~ell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 115, 148-51 (1992); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal 
Illusions: Establishment NeutmliQ and the 970 Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 266 (1987); see also William P. Marshall, We Rizow It When We See It": The 
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986). 
75. PAULINE M. ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: IN- 
SIGHTS, INROADS, AND INTRUSIONS 145 (1992). 
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power. So t h e  post-modernist advocate pleads for 
openmindedness t o  various points of view (multi-culturalism) 
when out of power and suppresses dissent (political correct- 
ness) when in power. 
This is the phenomenon of selective multi-culturalism: 
boundless tolerance and respect for some voices, and ruthless 
suppression of others. Religion is an especially vulnerable tar- 
get because religion represents the wisdom of the ages, which 
is an  obstacle to the transformation of society. With respect to 
the great post-modern concerns of sexuality, race, and gender, 
the advocates of social change are anything but indifferent 
toward the teachings of traditional religion-and since they are 
not indifferent they are not tolerant. Thus, feminists and gay- 
rights activists appear to feel no hesitation in using govern- 
ment power to force recalcitrant believers to change their evil 
ways. Churches, for example, should be forced to hire female 
priests and gay ministers, even if that is contrary to their own 
religious com~nitrnent.~~ A public school should be used, in  
Kathleen Sullivan's words, to "inculcate commitments to gender 
equality that are incompatible" with traditional interpretations 
of the Bible.?? Parents are stripped of the right to withdraw 
their children from sex education programs that are offensive 
to their religion or moral code." Catholic hospitals are forced 
to teach their medical students to perform  abortion^.'^ Many 
post-modernists have ceased to value freedom in its own right, 
but only as a means of promoting their own substantive ends. 
Thus, according to one feminist legal scholar, the Free Exercise 
Clause was a mistake, because "religion perpetuates and rein- 
forces women's subordination, and religious freedom impedes 
Even the unmasking of liberal neutrality has been selec- 
tive. I t  is recognized that the liberal tradition was patriarchal 
and Euro-centric, but rarely is it pointed out that liberalism is 
76. See Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. bat. Cas. (BNA) 
762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980) (attempt to force church to employ a homosexual organ- 
ist); cf. Becker, supra note 62, at 484 (proposing that churches that discriminate on 
the basis of sex in their selection of leaders be punished by denial of tax exemp- 
tions). 
77. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U .  CHI.  L. REV. 
195, 214 (1992). 
78. See Sylvia Moreno, Dinkins Backs Proposal for Condoms in Schools, 
NEWSDAY, February 26, 1991, at 3. But see Smith v. Ricci, 446 A.2d 501 (1982). 
79. St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990). 
80. Becker, supra note 62, at 459. 
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also secular. Indeed, post-modernists find it convenient to keep 
in place some of the intellectually discredited doctrinal baggage 
of liberalism when the issue is religion. The great exemplar of 
this phenomenon is Professor Mark Tushnet, a Critical Legal 
Studies scholar of great distinction and an authority on the 
question of religion under the First Amendment. Tushnet is the 
first to expose and deconstruct the seeming neutrality of the 
common law of property or contract; but when it comes to sup- 
posedly neutral laws that impinge on the practice of religion, 
Tushnet has resurrected the most formalistic of  position^.^' 
According to Tushnet, a law that imposes the same secular 
standards on the religious and the non-religious alike is neu- 
tral toward religion. This is a defensible position to take on 
some jurisprudential grounds (though I disagree with it), but it 
is surprising, to say the least, to hear it from the mouth of a 
Critical Legal Scholar. 
The effect of selective post-modernism is to  allow secular 
ideologies to use political muscle to advance their causes, in- 
cluding using the public schools to inculcate their ideals, with- 
out even the psychological constraint of liberal neutrality, but 
at the same time to preserve liberal formalism in court to en- 
sure that religion is not included in the public dialogue. Thus, 
in New York City the children are read Heather Has Two 
Mommies in the first grade and given information on anal 
intercourse in the sixthf2 but, as the Tenth Circuit recently 
held, The Bible in Pictures must be removed from the shelf of 
the ffith grade classroom library.83 
"God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!" 
If you dispute that fact, you have the inalienable right to sing, 
weep, laugh, and mumble, so long as you do it in private. That 
is the freedom of religion in the post-modern age. 
81. See Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court*: Kurland 
Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373. 
82. Joseph Berger, Board Agrees on Teaching About AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, June 
25, 1992, at B1; Lally Weymouth, Mrs. Cummins's Triumph, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 
1993, at A19. 
83. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
3025 (1992). 
